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The following doctoral thesis comprises two distinct sections, both describing a 
specific applied research concerning the macro-theme of computer security. The 
first section describes a proposal for the improvement and optimization of the 
storage space required for the management of cryptographic keys within a 
Hardware Security Module (HSM), whereas the second section outlines the design 
of an Outdoor Position Certification Authority (OPCA), a distributed client-server 
architecture aimed for the validation and certification of the positioning of a mobile 
device. 
 
A Hardware Security Module is a special device designed for cryptographic 
operations and cryptographic keys management. The latter keys are stored into the 
HSM and never exposed outside the device. All the operations carried out through 
the keys are performed inside the HSM so the operations result is indeed the only 
external outcome produced by the HSM. In order for the HSM to store all the keys 
that have to be managed, plenty of storage space is required. The biggest data 
centres, handling millions of cryptographic keys, need to host a large number of 
HSMs. The related costs are proportional to the number of HSMs used. These costs 
include: hardware, energy consumption, network hosting, network speed, 
management, etc. In this thesis, there can be found two methods to save the space 
useful for the storage of the keys in a HSM, so to reduce the number of HSMs 
needed and all related costs. While reducing costs on storage, expenses related to 
computation time will increase. 
 
The outlined Outdoor Position Certification Authority represents the project and 
design of a certification authority whose purpose is to certify the positioning of a 
mobile device equipped with a GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) receiver. 
In general, a GNSS receiver is capable of acquiring radio signals (low-level data) 
and navigation messages (high-level data) in the outdoor environments coming 
from different constellations of global/regional satellite navigation systems and 
satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS). To date, these data are not reliable 
from a security point of view, because they can be easily forged by malicious 
attackers through specialized spoofing techniques. An OPCA defines a client/server 
architecture through which a user can certify his position by sending to one or more 
remote servers the geo-localization information required for its verification. Once 
the truthfulness and reliability of the data received have been verified, the OPCA 
will issue and then send to the client a digitally signed document having legal force 
and certifying the position of the user in a given moment. The use of this service 
will concern different and multiple scenarios and the devices requiring it will 
extensively grow in number thanks to the spread of the Internet of Things (IoT).  
Here are some possible scenarios: remote digital signing of a document for users 
located in a specific place; certification of the geographical position of a user in a 
given moment; certification of geographical position related to the delivery of 
valuable goods; certification of geographical position in case of critical events, such 
as rescue operations, police actions, etc. 
 
The first section of this thesis has been carried out based on two scientific 
publications. The first one, entitled “Reducing Costs in HSM-Based Data Centres”, 
is a conference publication presented during the “International Conference on 
Green, Pervasive, and Cloud Computing 2017 (GPC 2017) at Cetara (SA)”. This 
paper offers a first experimental evaluation of what will be found in the next pages  
and referred to as “Enhanced HSM (EHSM)”. The second paper is a journal 
version, published in the “Journal of High Speed Networks (JHSN) - IOS Press”. 
In this publication, an alternative approach has been illustrated in relation to the 




The second section of the thesis is based on an International Patent registered at 
the European Patent Organization (EPO), its official number being EP 
18724344.9, and on a related paper, being completed, entitled “Design of an 
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The first section of the thesis comprises a proposal for the improvement and 
optimization of the storage space required for the management of cryptographic 
keys within a Hardware Security Module (HSM). 
A HSM is a device designed for implementing cryptographic operations. HSMs are 
used for crucial infrastructures widely required in the online banking applications 
or Certification Authorities (CAs), for example.  
In a CA context, a typical example of the use of a HSM, is the management 
(generation, storage and usage) of public and private keys. In high-speed networks 
requiring massive cryptographic operations, it is desirable to reduce the number of 
HSMs needed. 
There are several types of HSM having a different range of security levels and 
different characteristics. One of the main functions available on a HSM is the 
generation and management (storing and retrieval) of cryptographic keys that need 
to be protected with high-security standards. Generally, the keys generated and 
managed through a HSM never leave the device itself, in fact they are only used 
within the device.  
The HSM might as well offer some other functions such as cryptographic 
operations like encryption, digital signature, etc. Some HSMs are equipped with 
dedicated hardware for accelerated cryptographic operations. The level of security 
of a HSM can be assessed by the vendor who is able to provide a certification of 
international standards compliance. See [7] for a discussion about HSM and [12] 
about audit and backup procedures. 
 
The case of a CA using a cluster of HSMs to manage the cryptographic keys of its 
own users can be taken into consideration as an application in the real world. In 
addition, the digital signing of documents will also be given as an example of one 
of the services offered to the CA customers. The CA uses HSMs to generate and 
store the pair of public and private keys for each user and, subsequently, uses the 
private key for signing the documents. This approach provides a high-security level 
since the keys are only being used inside a HSM while the user receives directly the 
signed document. 
The management of the keys in a HSM requires a database for the keys storage. 
Therefore the space needed to store the keys is proportional to the number of keys. 
As an example, for reasons of simplification, let’s assume that a single HSM can 
host 1 million keys, and that the CA has 30 million users. At this point the CA has 
to manage a data centre of 30 HSMs, or possibly at least 60 if we consider a 
minimum of one backup per HSM. Therefore it can be inferred that the total cost 
increases by a factor of 30 or 60 when compared to a solution that uses one HSM 
only, as to say the case we are proposing. 
Below, the attention will be focused on the space usage in a HSM. More 
specifically, the stable storage space needed to store the keys managed by the HSM 
is considered as a “cost”.  
Two approaches that allow to save space for storing keys in a HSM will be 
presented. In practical applications, this improvement corresponds to a decrease in 
the total number of needed HSMs and consequently all other related costs.  It is 
necessary to remark that space saving corresponds to increased expenses in the 
computation time. The amount of the latter expense is however small. 
In the next pages two techniques that allows to save storage space will be presented: 
 
1. The first one uses an iterative approach and exploits basic properties of 
pseudo-random number generators; 
  
2. The second one, on the other hand, is based on the properties of pseudo-
random functions.  
 
For the iterative approach is proposed some trade-offs so that the extra computation 
time is reduced, but the space needed depends on the number of keys. 
 
The approach based on pseudo-random function unlike the previous one, does not 
require to store any information, apart from the initial seed. This method does not 
depend on the specific pseudo-random function used, the choice of which will only 
influence the overall efficiency of the method.  It is possible to use both the already 
known pseudo-random functions and any pseudo-random function that might be 
proposed in the future.  
Preliminaries results were presented in paper [5] using iterative and linear 
approaches. 
Previous results have been extended and presented in paper [6]. In this last article 
it’s shown the random function approach through which the other two methods are 
implemented. 
In the second section of the thesis, instead, is proposed the design of an Outdoor 
Position Certification Authority (OPCA), a distributed client-server architecture 
useful for the validation and certification of the position of a mobile device. 
Satellite navigation systems are based on a network of satellites orbiting around the 
Earth that send radio signals for the calculation of position, speed and time. The 
receiving devices, knowing the positions of each captured satellite (ephemeris), 
using a technique known as trilateration, can calculate the distance from each 
satellite and derive their position on Earth.  
Currently, satellite navigation systems cover most of the terrestrial surface, but the 
type of radio frequencies used for transmission (low power) allow the reception of 
signals only outdoor and not inside buildings.  
Most modern mobile devices (e.g. smartphones) are equipped with multi-
constellation and multi-band Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers 
to locate their position accurately. A higher number of satellites ensures greater 
accuracy in position detection and availability of the service even in areas where 
the coverage of the GNSS system is weak or subject to different types of distortions 
and errors, like, for example, urban areas, forests, etc.  
At present, most of these devices are able to acquire signals from the most important 
global satellite constellations, such as the NAVSTAR GPS of the United States and 
the GLONASS of Russia. Moreover new devices, spreading very rapidly on the 
market, are able to acquire and process signals from other global satellite systems, 
in addition to the mentioned constellations, such as the future BEIDOU-2 of China, 
the future GALILEO of the European Union and regional satellites system currently 
 
active such as BEIDOU-1 of China and the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) 
of Japan. These receivers are often designed to detect signals from Satellite-Based 
Augmentation Systems (SBAS) such as the United States Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS), the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
(EGNOS) of the European Union, the Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation 
System (MSAS) of Japan, the GPS Aided Geo Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) of 
India, the GLONASS System for Differential Correction and Monitoring (SDCM) 
of Russia and the Satellite Navigation Augmentation System (SNAS) of China. 
Currently the detection of positioning information is unreliable from a security 
point of view, because GNSS data can be easily manipulated on common mobile 
devices. For example, there are equipment capable of reproducing an artificial 
GNSS signal and spoofing the detection performed by the mobile device's sensor. 
There exists various spoofing techniques and each one has a different degree of 
difficulty. For each spoofing technique there are certain countermeasures to be 
taken depending on the type of attack. Various methods have been proposed in the 
scientific literature to verify whether a GNSS signal detected by a sensor is original 
or altered. These methods offer mechanisms to identify possible inconsistencies on 
the detected signals, present only in an artificially reproduced signal, but they are 
not applicable on common mobile devices because very complex to implement, 
especially in devices with low computational power and low availability in terms 
of memory and energy autonomy. Because of these weaknesses, to date, it is 
difficult to offer services that require fine and secure knowledge of a user's position 
at a given time. 
In this second section of the thesis is described the idea and the design of this service 
called “Outdoor Position Certification Authority” (OPCA). An OPCA aims at 
overcoming the limitations of current available systems by providing a centralized 
system where one or more remote servers are able to acquire, process and adopt all 
the most advanced anti-spoofing techniques to identify anomalous situations and 
certify the user's position with extreme accuracy. 
The service can be used by any mobile device and is useful in many real scenarios. 
Smartphones and similar devices might clearly benefit from the service and be used, 
for example, to sign documents with a proof of location or to allow the delivery of 
goods only in a specified location. The service could also be extended to the devices 
of the Internet of Things, whenever the certification of the place is required. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows.  The first section describes the idea behind the 
EHSM and covers the followings chapters and topics: 
 
 In Chapter 2 are recalled the notion of pseudo-random number generator 
and the concept of pseudo-random function; 
 
 In Chapter 3 are summarized the functioning of a HSM;  
 
 In Chapter 4 are described the techniques that allow to save space for the 
key storage in a HSM and the functioning of an EHSM; 
 
The second section of the thesis describes the idea and design of an OPCA and 
covers the followings chapters and topics: 
 
 In Chapter 5 are provided the bases of the current geo-referencing systems 
and a description of the signals and navigation data used by GNSS satellites;  
 
 In Chapter 6 is described the architecture of the OPCA service, the steps of 
the position certification process and the certification levels that can be 
obtained;  
 
 Chapter 7 discusses possible system attacks and countermeasures.  
 
























2.1 Random and pseudo random number 
 
Random numbers are fundamental for the implementation of cryptographic 
primitives. A True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is a device capable of 
generating numbers that are truly random. A TRNG uses physical inputs from 
which it extracts random bits and is typically based on microscopic phenomena, 
such as thermal noise, photoelectric effect or macroscopic ones, such as user 
keyboard typing, network traffic, and others. These phenomena are, at least in 
theory, completely unpredictable and thus extrapolating bits from them produces 
truly random values. In order to do so it is necessary to somehow transform the 
physical phenomenon into an electrical signal, then measure the signal and thus 
produce a bit value. By repeating the process over the randomly varying physical 
phenomenon it is possible to produce a sequence of random bits.  
However the above described process requires time for each single bit. The 
consequence is that a TRNG cannot produce random bits at a very high speed and 
thus the amount of random bits that it generates is limited. Usually TRNG are used 
to produce a limited number of truly random bits which are then used as a seed to 
produce a sequence of pseudo-random numbers with a Pseudo-Random Number 
Generator (PRNG). 
 
A PRNG is a deterministic algorithm but the numbers that it generates have the 
property of being indistinguishable from truly random ones. Thus, pseudo-random 
numbers can be used in lieu of truly random ones. The initial state of a PRNG is 
determined by the seed. The PRNG, at each iteration, generates a new value from 
the previous one (the very first one is generated from the seed). 
A fundamental property of a pseudo-random number generator is the following: the 
sequence of numbers given in output is deterministically determined by the seed. 
That is, starting from the same seed s we get the same sequence of numbers  
 
Seq(s) = r1, r2 … 
 
At some point the sequence will repeat itself, that is, there exists index p such that 
 
rjp+1 = r1,  rjp+2 = r2  for  j = 1, 2 … 
 
The value of p is the period. The period cannot be more that 2n, where n is the 
length in bits of the seed. The period depends on the specific implementation of the 
PRNG and in some cases can be made explicit without actually producing all the 
values until the repetition starts. 
We summarize below the basic properties of PRNGs: 
 
1 The probability distribution of the generated numbers must be uniform over 
the entire possible interval; 
 
2 Each element of the sequence must be independent from the other (that is all 
the values must be non correlated). 
 
Moreover for cryptographic applications some stronger properties must be satisfied 
in order to consider the PRNG cryptographically secure (CSPRNG): 
 
1 The sequence of produced numbers must be indistinguishable from a truly 
random sequence (for the notion of indistinguishability see for example [10]); 
 
 
2 It must be computationally infeasible for any attacker, to derive from a given 
subsequence of the numbers, previous or subsequent values; 
 
3 It must be computationally infeasible for any attacker to derive, from a given 
internal state of the CSPRNG, past or future values. 
 
We refer the reader to well-known standards, such as [1], or textbooks on 
cryptography, such as [10], for more details about PRNGs.  There are several 
standard tests to certify that a PRNG is cryptographically secure. We refer the 
reader to [2] for more details about such tests. 
 
2.1.1 Example 
As an example of pseudo-random generator we cite the well-known Blum-Blum-
Shub generator [3].  In this one the sequence is given by  
 
xn+1 = x2n mod F 
 
where F = p x q  is obtained by multiplying two large primes p and q. 
 
This generator is usually used to extract one pseudo-random bit, which is the parity 
of xn+1; the seed should be a number not divisible for p and q.  
 
Other well-known pseudo-random number generators are the Blum-Micali [4] and 








2.2 Random and pseudo random function 
 
A truly random function is a function whose output, the first time, is a randomly 
chosen value.  
One way to implement a random function f is the following:  
 
1 Given in input x, if f(x)=y has not yet been calculated, then a random 
number generator is used to generate y, y is provided as output and the pair 
(x; y=f(x)) is memorized;  
 
2 If f(x) has already been calculated previously, then simply return the value 
y=f(x), recovering the pair (x; f(x)). 
  
A negative aspect of this approach is that implementing the function requires a lot 
of space for storing all the possible values. 
 
A pseudo-random function is an efficient, deterministic function that maps two 
distinct sets (domain and range) and looks like a truly random function. The output 
of a pseudo-random function is indistinguishable from that of a truly random 
function. A well known pseudo-random function is that provided by Goldereich, 
Goldwasser and Micali which is based on the so-called Merkle tree. Another well 
known pseudo-random function is that provided by Naor and Reingold.  
More specifically, this latter pseudo-random function is implemented in the 
following way. Consider a prime number p, another prime number q which is also 
the divisor of p-1, let g be an element of order q in Z*p and (a0, a1, …, an) 
a sequence of n + 1 elements of Zq. The pseudo-random function is defined, for 
any n-bit input x = (x1, x2, …, xn), as:  
 







Hardware Security Module (HSM) 
 
 
3.1 Basic concepts 
 
A Hardware Security Module (HSM) is a device equipped with appropriate 
firmware/software that from the user perspective works as a “black box”. The main 
purpose of a HSM is that of managing in a secure way cryptographic keys: it can 
generate new keys, store them, use the keys to encrypt or sign documents, etc. 
The keys are protected in the sense that they are never directly accessible to the 
applications that have to use them. Instead, the keys can be used only through the 
API (Application Program Interface) exposed by the HSM.  
The HSM can offer both fundamental cryptographic services, such as digital 
signatures, and the possibility of executing complex cryptographic manipulation on 
dedicated hardware. 
A HSM can take several forms: smart cards, PCI cards, USB tokens, embedded 
systems or standalone devices that can communicate through various channels 
(USB, Ethernet, RS-232, etc.). Each single device has its own functionalities and is 
designed for specific goals. For this reason different devices are called in different 
ways: PCSM (Personal Computer Security Module), SAM (Secure Application 
Module), SCD (Secure Cryptographic Device), SSCD (Secure Signature Creation 
Device), TRSM (Tamper Resistant Security Module), etc. 
 
 
In the next pages the term HSM will simply be used to identify all these devices. 
Indeed, regardless of the specific device and the specific functionalities offered, we 
can identify, for all of them, some main general objectives which are: 
 
 Better performances for cryptographic operations; 
 
 Efficient key management; 
 
 Avoid data leakage or loss. 
 
So we will use the generic term HSM to identify any device designed to meet the 
above general goals. To achieve these goals a HSM might offer functionalities such 
as hardware acceleration for cryptographic operations, private and public 
encryption, hashing, pseudo-random or true-random number generation. Moreover 
a HSM can be protected with tampering indicating seals, special screws, sensors for 
temperature, light and movement, data erasing upon unauthorized intrusion, etc. 
 
3.1.1 Standards 
There exist international standards and a HSM should come equipped with a 
certification of the standard compliance accomplished. Most of the HSMs are 
compliant with the FIPS 140-2 international standard approved by the U.S.A. 
government. 
Most of the HSMs commercially available offer various types of APIs, such as the 
standards OASIS PKCS#11, MS CAPI/CNG, Java JCA/JCE, etc. Within these APIs 
it is possible to use most of the common cryptographic tools and objects, such as 
RSA keys, X.509 certificates, DES/Triple DES keys, etc.  
Through these API a HSM can be used to: 
 
 Create and securely store (in the HSM) cryptographic keys; 
 
 Managing the keys; 
 
 Use the keys (to sign, encrypt and decrypt).  
 
 
3.2 Key generation and signature process 
 







Figure 1 - HSM keys generation process 
 
 
Let U be the user. Through the API the HSM receives a request for key generation 
from a (legitimate) user U. In order to generate random values the TRNG provides 
a random seed for the CSPRNG. Then the CSPRNG generates a random value r. 
This random value is used to derive a pair of keys (KUpub; KUpriv).  
The private key KUpriv will be stored in the stable storage of the HSM. Depending 
on the level of security that the HSM has to guarantee the key can be encrypted 
before being stored.  The public key KUpub, instead, is passed to the module for the 
generation of the certificate which, in turn, is given back to the user, through the 
API.   
Notice that the private keys stays in the HSM and is not given back to the user. The 
user can use the key only through the operations allowed by the API of the HSM. 
 





Figure 2 - HSM signature process 
 
 
A legitimate user U requests the signature of a document D through the API. The 
HSM has to retrieve the private key KUpriv of user U by means of a search in the 
embedded database. If the keys are encrypted the HSM needs to decrypt it. Then 
document D can be signed and the signed document is provided back to the user. 
















4.1 On-the-fly key generation 
 
In a real-world application of a HSM used by a certification authority (CA) to 
manage the cryptographic keys of the user and the documents signing process on 
behalf of the users, it is possible to identify two crucial points: 
 
1 There are potentially many keys to manage (e.g. millions): it is necessary to 
store them and have backup copies; 
 
2 The storage space can become a bottleneck: once all the available memory of 
the HSM has been used it is not possible to generate new keys. 
 
The solution proposed in this thesis aims at avoiding these crucial points. 
Without loss of generality it is possible to assume that for each user U there is a 
need to store a pair of keys (KUpub; KUpriv). Other types of keys (e.g. keys for 
symmetric cryptography) can be handled in similar ways.  





Recomputing the keys can be done exploiting the fundamental property of a 
CSPRNG: the sequence of pseudo-random numbers generated is a deterministic 
function of the seed. So it is possible to store only one seed, called master secret 
seed (mss), and from this seed it is possible to generate every time the same 
sequence of pseudo-random numbers. Let  
 
Seq(mss) = r1, r2, …, rp  where p is the period. 
 
This sequence will be used to generate the needed keys on-the-fly.  Of course it is 
necessary to make sure that:  
 
1 The keys dynamically generated for user U are always the same;  
 
2 The security warranties are the same as for the case when the keys are stored 
in the HSM. 
 
To achieve property (1), to each user U of the system is associated an index  
 
iU ∈ [1; p] 
 
That is, to each user U is associated the pseudo-random value riU. When generating 
the pair of keys for user U first is retrieved riU from the CSPRNG; riU is uniquely 
determined by the user U, then it is used to generate (KUpub; KUpriv). Thus for 
user U it will always be generated the same pair of public/private key. 
 
Property (2) is achieved because the keys are not stored; thus information leakage 
can happen only if an attacker gets the master secret seed. The master secret seed is 
stored internally in the EHSM in lieu of the keys, so it is subject to the same 
protection as the keys in a HSM. 
Normally the HSM stores for each user U its pair of private/public keys. Upon a 
user U request, the HSM retrieves (KUpub; KUpriv)and use them for the requested 
operation. This requires the HSM to store all the keys.  
 
So on one extreme one has a HSM that stores all the keys, on the other extreme one 
has an EHSM that does not store any key but only the master secret seed (and each 
time a key is needed it gets generated).  So the price to pay for not storing keys is 






Figure 3 - Key generation process comparison 
 
 
Between these two extremes it is possible to have approaches that store only some 
keys. The difference between the HSM and the EHSM is that in a standard HSM is 
used a database to store all the keys, while in an EHSM the key is on-the-fly 




4.1.1 Key generation 






Figure 4 - EHSM keys generation process 
 
The database contains only the master secret seed mss. Let U be the user that 
requests the generation of the keys. If this is the first request, i.e., no mss has been 
generated yet, then a Random Module (TRNG) is used to generated the mss.  
An Index Module associates to each user U a unique index iU. Such a mapping can 
be done in several ways and the specific method chosen is irrelevant (one could use 
a pre-determined mapping, like social security numbers or similar identification 
numbers): what it is needed is simply that each user gets a unique index (if a user 
is allowed to have multiple keys then an index is required for each key; in other 
words this means that the user needs to have a pseudonym for each key). Consider 
for example the case of Certification Authority (CA). The index iU can be assigned 
upon a registration process: Ui are the clients that register to the service; the index 
iU is an index assigned when the person physically register to the service, for 
 
example, showing an official identification document.  The index associated with 
the user is not an information to be kept secret with the same level of security as the 
private key. For this reason it is possible to manage these indexes outside the HSM. 
So the Index Module simple has to implement the mapping U -> iU. At this point 
a CSPRNG is used to generate the pseudo-random sequence of numbers starting 
from the master secret seed and generating exactly iU numbers of the sequence. 
The last generated number riU is then used to generate the pair of keys (KUpub; 
KUpriv). At this point the EHSM proceeds with the response to the user to pass back 
the certificate containing the public key. Notice that the private key is deleted. 
 
 
4.1.2 Signing of a document 






Figure 5 - EHSM on the fly document signature 
 
The user U provides the document D in the request. As for the key generation 
request, the EHSM uses the Index Module to retrieve the index iU associated to user 
U and basically repeats the key generation phase described before (obviously if the 
 
user has not yet generated the key an error must be raised; in the setting of EHSM 
a user does not really need to have a key generation phase but an enrollment phase 
which correspond to the fact that the user is given a unique index).  
Once the private key KUpriv has been regenerated, the EHSM can sign the document 
D and give back the signed document through the API. The private KUpriv (as well 
as the public key KUpub) gets deleted. 
The key point in an EHSM is the generation of the index iU of the pseudo random 
number riu of the sequence.  
In the following will be discussed an iterative approach through three different 
techniques and an approach based on random function.  
 
 
4.2 Iterative approach 
The first technique of the iterative approach simply iterates on the sequence of 
pseudo-random numbers generated by the CSPRNG starting from the master secret 
seed for iU times. The two alternative techniques, instead, store some of the values 
of the pseudo-random sequence to speed up key generation. 
Let U = {U1, U2, …, Un} be the set of users. The ordering used to denote this 
set is not important in the sense that we do not have to use, and actually we don’t 
want to use, iU = j for the jth user.  
Let I = {1, 2, …, Z}  N be the set of possible indexes. As already 
mentioned above there could be several ways in which the mapping U -> I is 
constructed (iU can be assigned upon a registration process.). It is convenient to 
keep Z as small as possible; clearly Z needs also to be large enough to deal with all 
possible users. In fact we can set I = N, and indicate with Z the biggest index 
used. This index will affect the performance of the system and it is convenient to 
keep it as small as possible. Notice that Z is tied to the period p of the CSPRNG. 
More precisely we must ensure that p > Z. 
Having set the mapping U -> I we now concentrate on the mapping I -> R, 




4.2.1 Simple Iterative technique 
The “simple iterative” technique is the most obvious one. To generate the ith 
pseudorandom number of the sequence, it is possible to iterate on the sequence  
 
r1, r2, … 
 
starting from the first element r1 up to the ith one ri. This approach is very simple. 
It requires exactly i iterations. This can be a problem if i is very large. This 
situation is actually what we expect since the main motivation for the use of an 
EHSM is the handling of a large number of keys, so large that we are worrying 
about space usage. 
 
 
4.2.2 Linear Storing technique 
An improvement over the “simple iterative” technique is a “linear storing” 
technique. In order to diminish the time needed for the simple iterative technique it 
is possible to store some keys in the database. Let s be a parameter (e.g., s = 
1000). Upon first generation, now in the database are stored the pseudo-random 
values of the sequence with indexes that are a multiple of s:  
 
rs, r2s, r3s ….  
 
Thus, when the ith pseudo-random number of the sequence will have to be 
generated, instead of iterating from r1, it is possible to start from ri/s.  
Whit this method each request can be satisfied with at most s iterations. However 
it should be noticed that this comes at the expense of space: if s is too small the 
space-saving advantages of the EHSM are lost (in the extreme case of s = 1 we 




4.2.3 Exponential Storing technique 
A trade-off approach between the iterative and the linear storing one is an 
“exponential storing” technique in which instead of storing all values in the 
positions multiple of a constant s in the sequence, we store only the elements that 
are in the positions that are an exponent of a constant c.  
Take for example c = 2, so the following sequence of values will be stored 
 
r1, r2, r4, r8, r16, … r1024, … 
 
This technique needs logarithmic space, thus still a substantial improvement over 
the linear space of a regular HSM. The time required to retrieve a pseudo-random 
value depends on the index: the smaller the index the fastest will be the retrieval. 
This is similar to what happens for the simple iterative technique but in this case do 
not have to start from the first element but only from the biggest power of c that is 
smaller than the index. 
 
 
4.2.4 Time analysis 
In order to assess the advantages and the disadvantages of the three proposed 
technique some preliminary tests have been conducted. The following table shows 
the advantages and the disadvantages of the proposed techniques. In the table is 
evaluated the extra time needed by an EHSM to satisfy a user request. More 
specifically N is the number of users and R is a sequence of user request. The 
sequence of requests is randomly generated. In these tests are shown the time 
needed to satisfy the request using a standard HSM and using an EHSM with each 
of the three proposed techniques. To simplify is assumed that a HSM database look-
up takes 0.001ms; thus in a standard HSM a sequence of R user requests will take 
R × 0.001ms to be satisfied.  
Table 1 reports the overall time consumption. The first variant is the one that takes 
more time since is the one that saves more space. Similarly the third variant takes 
























4.3 Random Function approach 
 
The generation of the pseudo-random number riU can occur more efficiently, 
without storing any information, apart from the initial seed (mss), through an 
alternative technique that makes use of the pseudo-random function. The 
proposed technique is independent from the specific pseudo-random function used, 
the choice of which will only influence the overall efficiency of the method.  
The fundamental property to satisfy is that starting from the user identifier IDU and 
the associated index iU, the function always returns the same pseudo-random value 
riU.  
All pseudo-random functions satisfy this property. The method can be used both 
with the already known pseudo-random function and with any pseudo-random 
function that will be proposed in the future. 
The advantages of the solution based on pseudo-random functions with respect to 
the iterative approach are the following: 
 
1 It is necessary to store only the master secret seed, without the need to make 
intermediate values persistent through specific data structures; 
 
2 All the values and information useful for creating the key pair for the user U 
with IDU (index iU, pseudo-random value riU ) are generated on-the-fly 
starting from the master secret seed; 
 
3 Reduced number of intermediate pseudo-random values to be generated before 




4.3.1 Example of implementation through “Goldreich, Goldwasser 
and Micali pseudo-random function” 
 
Below it is shown an example of riU generation through the use of the “Goldreich, 
Goldwasser and Micali” (GGM) pseudo-random function. See [9] [10] and [13] for 
an in-depth description of how GGM is built. Very briefly for our purposes, at each 
step the GGM expands the input, with a specific binary length, in a pseudo-random 
sequence of double binary length. 
This pseudo-random function is based on the Hash Tree data structure also known 
as Merkle Tree. A hash tree is a tree of hashes in which the leaves are hashes of 
data blocks and intermediate nodes in the tree are the hashes of their respective 
children. 
In our application the hash tree is a complete balanced binary tree, where the values 







Figure 6 - Mapping of the user index iU with pseudo-random number riU 
 
 
To generate the pseudo-random number riU for the user U it is necessary to expand 
the master secret seed (mss) a number of times equal to the height of the binary tree 
that corresponds to the number of bits needed to represent the iU user index.  
 
For example, if it is used the SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) to associate a unique 
index i to each user U the bit length of the index iU is equivalent to 160.  If we 
indicate this hash bit length with m, then all the possible hash values are n = 2m  
and corresponds to the set of the possible user indexes iU. 
By assigning to each branch of the hash tree a binary value {0, 1}, the path from 
the root to a leaf is the binary representation of the user index iU. The initial input 
of the Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali pseudo-random function is the mss, the 
root of the binary tree.  
At each step the function expands the input, with binary length z, in a sequence r 
of length |r| = 2z bits.  
This sequence is splittet in two equal subsequences |r1| = z and |r2| = z 
and every subsequence is assigned to the children nodes of the current expanded 
node. In this way, to reconstruct the value of each father node, it is sufficient to 
concatenate the hash values of the two children nodes.  
The number of times that the mss is expanded in a bits sequence with length 2z 
depends to the bit length of the iU user index and corresponds to the height of the 
hash tree (m = logn levels).  
The path from the root to the leaf represents the expansion path from the mss (root 
node) to the pseudo-random number (leaf node) riU, this binary path is described 
through the binary representation of the user index iU.  
Once the pseudo-random value riU has been calculated, it is possible to generate 
cryptographic keys for the user U. 
Using instead the pseudo-random function of “Noar and Reingold”, starting from 
the master secret seed the calculation is immediate and does not require any 
intermediate expansion.  
 
SECTION 2  
 
 
Outdoor Position  
















5.1 Basic concepts 
Before starting the description of the design of the OPCA, we will give some basic 
concepts concerning data and signals sent to earth by a GNSS satellite. Such 
knowledge will be useful later to understand the certification process. For simplicity 
we will limit the description to the signals and messages of the satellite navigation 
system more diffused globally: the NAVSTAR GPS of the United States. In order 
to provide the certification of the position an OPCA analyzes both high level data 
(GNSS messages of the specific satellite constellation properly encoded and 
modulated) and low-level data (raw data such as codes and characteristics of radio 
frequencies).  
In particular the GPS simultaneously transmits several navigation messages using 






5.1.1 Ranging codes 
Each satellite of the GPS constellation sends two types of legacy ranging codes, 
called C/A-code (Coarse Acquisition Code) and P(Y)-code (Precision Y-code). 
Both of these codes are pseudo-random binary sequences specific to each satellite. 
These codes are modulated on the same frequency through the Code Division 
Multiple Access technique. A fundamental characteristic of this code is the low 
probability of cross-correlation with the codes of th other satellites, with the 
background noise and other types of interference. Both codes are modulated on 
UHF radio frequency belonging to the microwave L band through the Bi-Phase 
Shift Keying. The C/A code is for civilian use and is transmitted in clear at repeated 




Figure 7 - GPS ranging codes, navigation messages, carrier and signals 
 
 
Although it is a PRN code, the C/A-code is predictable and reproducible from the 
mobile device to be synchronized with the code generated by the satellite. The P(Y)- 
 
 
code is encrypted modulating an encoded sequence called W-code, periodically 
updated by the US Defense Department. The P(Y)-code is transmitted on the radio 
frequencies L1 and L2 and can be used for navigation exclusively for military 
purposes. This code in the common mobile devices for civil use cannot be used for 
navigation and positioning. It is not decipherable and not predictable, but given its 
structure and the known frequencies with which the W-code is applied, through 
appropriate techniques, it is possible to detect, trace and use it in conjunction with 
the C/A-code to improve positioning accuracy of the latter. 
 
 
5.1.2 Navigation Messages 
On the signals of the ranging codes C/A and P(Y) L1 is added a 50 bit/s navigation 
message. This navigation message includes 3 basic information: 
 date, time and health status of the specific satellite; 
 
 position in orbit of the single satellite of the constellation (ephemeris valid 
for 4 hours); 
 
 state of the constellation, approximate position of all satellites and 
ionospheric models for the correction of radio signal propagation errors 
(almanac - valid for 180 days). 
A GPS message consists of a 1500-bit frame. Each frame is composed of 5 
subframes of 300 bits, numbered from 1 to 5, in turn composed of 10 words of 30 




Figure 8 - GPS navigation messages: frame, subframes and words 
 
Subframe 1 contains date and time, subframes 2 and 3 contain the ephemerides of 
the specific satellite, while subframes 4 and 5 contain the almanac (information on 
the whole constellation, ionospheric models, tropospheric models and other info). 
Each frame contains 1/25th of the entire almanac, this means that to transmit the 




To accurately determine the position of a GNSS receiver on the Earth it is necessary 
to calculate the distance of at least 4 satellites. At any given moment, the more 







Figure 9 - GNSS devices and satellites 
 
 
Every navigation message contains the timestamp of when it was generated. This 
timestamp is produced through an atomic clock. Periodically, the satellite's time is 
synchronized from Earth to correct the errors induced by orbital velocity and Earth's 
gravity. From the propagation speed of the radio signal and the global ionospheric 
correction models contained in the GPS navigation message, it is possible to 
establish the distance from each satellite by calculating the propagation time of the 
signal; this can be done by comparing the starting timestamp generating on the 















The data sent from GNSS are unreliable from a security point of view, because they 
can be easily forged by malicious attackers through specialized spoofing 
techniques. An OPCA is a certification authority whose purpose is to certify the 
position of a mobile device equipped with a GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite 
System) receiver. An OPCA defines a client/server architecture through which a 
user can certify his position by sending the geolocalization information needed to 
verify it to one or more remote servers. Once the truthfulness and reliability of the 
data received has been verified, the OPCA will issue and send to the client a signed 
positioning certificate with legal value certifying the position of the user in a given 
moment.  
The proposed OPCA has a client-server architecture: there are one or more remote 
servers acting as trusted geolocalization authority (OPCAServer1, OPCAServer2, 
...etc.) and a client running on the mobile device (OPCA-Client in short).  
The OPCA authority operates in a specific geographical area, subdivided into 
different subareas, each of which operates a specific OPCAServer. 
The subareas are created taking into account three fundamental aspects:  
 
 The particular geographical conformation of the area where the service is 
provided;  
 
 The number of potential users in the area;  
 
 The quality of the GNSS signal coverage.  
Each OPCAServer offers a secure geolocalization service to users who request it 
through the OPCA-Client installed on the personal mobile device. This application 
has the task of collecting geolocalization information acquired through the GNSS 
receiver and sending it to the nearest OPCAServer, responsible for this subarea, 






Figure 10 - OPCA architecture, area and subareas 
 
 
Each OPCAServer is equipped with at least two GNSS receiving antennas, which 
allow to apply special antispoofing techniques based on radio interferometry 
analysis of the signals. The OPCAServer acquires GNSS signals at regular intervals 
within a reference time window whose width can be parameterized according to the 
load requirement. The acquired radio signals are processed, stored and divided into 
 
high-level navigation data and low-level navigation data. Within each category the 
processed data have different priority and weight in the verification steps depending 
on the level of certification requested by the client. 
 
 
6.1.1 Certification Levels 
Safe positioning can be required for different types of services and/or scenarios. 
Each service can be associated with a particular level of certification corresponding 
to a specific level of security. For each level of certification, the client will be asked 
to send a particular data set. The highest level of certification (from the point of 
view of security) that a client can request depends directly on its ability to acquire 
and process the different types of high and low level data necessary for the 
appropriate verification steps. In case of insufficient information, the OPCA returns 
a probabilistic answer on the degree of reliability of the client request. In some 
usage scenarios it may be sufficient to know that geolocalization is not certain, but 
the checks carried out indicate that it would be difficult to recreate an eventual 
spoofing attack; anyway, the attack would require huge and sophisticated 
technological resources. Therefore the OPCA can catalog the client requests with 
respect to the degree of reliability of the information received and consequently re- 
lease different certification security levels of the position according to the specific 
scenario and/or service requested. 
 
 
6.1.2 Scalability: OPCA area and subareas 
To increase efficiency, scalability and security of the service it is possible to provide 
a balancing and proximity mechanism of requests through the installation of 
multiple servers and GNSS receivers within the same subarea. In relation to the 
specific needs of the case (size of the subarea, number of requests, particular 
geographic configuration) the communication between the various OPCA servers 
belonging to the same subarea may include a peer-to-peer or a master-slave 




6.1.3 OPCA Client requirements 
To avoid tampering of the OPCAClient app, it is essential to execute the client app 
in a safe execution environment (Sandbox). An example of sandbox is the 
“Samsung KNOX System" designed for Android operating systems; other Android 
sandbox systems are described in [23].  
In addition to the data contained in high-level navigation messages, the application 
must be able to access and manipulate low level raw data (for different certification 
levels) of the radio signals detected by the GNSS receiver through appropriate 
services provided by the hardware and/or by the software. For example the latest 
versions of the Android OS provides an application programming interface for 
accessing low-level features of a GNSS signal. 
The user must be registered to the secure geolocalization service, identifying both 
the instance of the client application installed on the mobile device and the device 
itself (enrollment phase). It is necessary to ensure a unique association “user-
application-device".  
The mobile device must have the GNSS sensor switched on during the user 
registration/enrollment phase and during the position's certification request.  
For the success of the position's certification process it is essential to synchronize 




6.1.4 GNSS high level and raw data 
To apply different antispoofing techniques and certify the relative level of secure 
positioning, the OPCAServer requests the OPCAClient to send the high and low 
(raw) level data shown in Tables 1 and Table 2. For simplicity of exposure, we will 
refer exclusively to some high level and raw data of the GPS satellite navigation 
system. Upon reception of the data from the client side, the OPCAServer will start 
the analysis and the comparison with the GNSS data acquired on the server side in 
the reference time window. The analysis process involves several steps in which 





GPS High Level Data 
Description Data 





GPS data frame's navigation message 
(words) 
Correction on standard frequencies 
Age of data (AODC) and coe_cients for the 
ionospheric delay related to the L1 frequency 
sent by the control center 
Ephemeris of each satellite and AODE instant 
reference (Age 
of Data) sent by the control center; 
Almanac of the whole satellite constellation 
generated by the control center (truncated 
ephemerides, clocks corrections, 
satellite identi_cation number, satellite health 
status) 
High-level data processed by the GPS 
satellite receiver 
Total number of in sight satellites 
Total number of in use satellites 
PRN Number of the satellite 
Elevation in degrees (max 90) of the satellite 
Azimuth in degrees (from 000 to 359) of the 
satellite 
Eccentricity 
Satellite speed with respect to the ground 
HDOP (Horizontal Dilution of Precision) 
 
VDOP (Vertical Dilution of Precision) 
PDOP (Position (3D) Dilution Of Precision 
TDOP (Time Dilution Of Precision) 
Date and time 
Week number of the GPS system 
Latitude of the calculated position 
Longitude of the calculated position 
Receiver height above sea level 
Separation from the Geoide 
GPS signal quality 
Magnetic variation 
High-level data processed by the satellite 
receiver related to other satellite 
navigation constellations (GLONASS, 











GPS Raw Data 
Description Data 
Predictable pseudorange code GPS C/A-
code L1 
Code values 
Code phase values 
GPS radio signals Carrier values 
 Phase values 
 Doppler shift values 
 Signal strength values 
 C/N0 carrier to noise density e/o SNR  signal 
to noise ratio 
Noise code statistics of the GPS 
pseudorange C/A-code L1 
Standard deviation of the semi-major axis of 
the error ellipse (in meters) 
 Standard deviation of the semi-minor axis of 
the error ellipse (in meters); 
 Orientation of the semi-major axis of the 
ellipse of error (in degrees) 
 Standard deviation in meters of the latitude 
error 
 Standard deviation in meters of longitude 
error 
 Standard deviation in meters of altitude error 
Values related to the pseudo-random 
pattern of the encrypted military code P 








6.2 Server side verification steps 
The verification of the information of positioning is organized in 4 steps, which 
reflect the most secure GNSS antispoofing techniques. Such steps are organized in 
security, reliability and complexity order. 
 
 
6.2.1 Step A - Check of signals direction, speed and movement 
This set of checks include check of signals direction, speed and movement of the 
received GPS satellites. This is the most complex verification phase in terms of 
hardware and software resources and corresponds to the highest level of the 
position's certification. For every GPS satellite for which data is received, the 
OPCAServer acquires the values (a1) and the phase (a2) of the PRN C/A-code L1, 
the values of the carrier (a3) and the phase (a4) of the low level radio signal and the 
values of the doppler shift (a5) produced by the relative movement satellite-receiver 
(continuous change of the signal frequency).  
Using multiple GNSS antennas installed in the subarea where the specific 
OPCAServer operates, appropriate interferometry techniques are used to calculate 
the direction of the radio signals and speed of the satellites, in the specific window 
of reference, with respect to the server. The same values (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) are 
also acquired on the client side (OPCAClient) and sent to the OPCAServer for the 
calculation of the direction of the signals and the speed of the satellites with respect 
to the client. Discrepancies and incompatibilities between signal direction and 
satellite speed calculated in the reference window between OPCAServer and 








6.2.2 Step B - Check signal power, signal/noise ratio and pseudorange   
        code noise  
This set of checks include check of the power, the signal/noise ratio of the radio 
signal and the noise of the pseudorange code C/A-code L1 of the GPS.  
In this phase, it is verified that some intrinsic characteristics of the GNSS radio 
signals acquired on the client side, in the reference time window, are plausible and 
not artificially generated. The OPCAServer verifies that the values sent by the client 
relative to the signal power (b1), to the signal/noise ratio (b2) - (C/N0 - carrier to 
noise density and/or SNR - signal to noise ratio) - and to the noise of the 
pseudorange code C/A-code L1 (b3) belong to a certain range of values that can be 
recorded by a real mobile device. 
 
 
6.2.3 Step C - Check military pseudorange code pattern 
This set of checks include check of the pattern of the encrypted GPS military 
pseudorange code P(Y)-code L1. In this phase, the OPCAServer traces the pattern 
of the military pseudorange code P(Y)-code L1 (c3) encrypted and not predictable 
for each GPS satellite received within the reference time window. The values of 
these patterns acquired on the server side will be compared with the values of the 




6.2.4 Step D - Check GPS data frame structure 
This set of checks include check of the GPS data frame structure, of the data bits 
contained in it (telemetry, navigation message) and of the high level data processed 
by the GNSS client receiver related to GPS and all other satellite navigation 
constellations (GLONASS, GALILEO , BEIDU, etc.). 
 
In this step the OPCAServer compares its acquired values to data frame structure 
(d1), navigation messages (d2) (data bit contained in the data frame) and high-level 
data with those processed and sent by the client (d3) of all the satellites captured in 
the reference time window. The client values must be identical to the corresponding 






6.3 Certification levels 
 
The maximum reliability and level of the position's certification is obtained by 
processing the checks in all four verification steps.  
There are two main levels of certification: Level A and Level B. Each level of 
certification of the position can be used by the user in the process of requesting a 
specific service provided by a subject/company/institution operating in a particular 
context/scenario/sector of business.  
Level A is the highest in terms reliability and can be used in mission-critical 
contexts, where the requirements in terms of security in position detection are 
stringent. This level is divided into three certification sub-levels: Level A1, Level 
A2 and Level A3.  
For the release of the highest position's certification level (Level A1), the 
OPCAServer must be able to perform the checks of all four verification steps 
through the information acquired and processed on the server side and sent by the 
client: verification of low level data (steps A, B and C) and verification of high level 
data (step D).  
The release of Level A certification requires higher costs in terms of money on the 
client side given the greater need of resources in terms of computational power on 
the server side (hardware/software resources, memory, disk space and 
computational time).  
Level B corresponds to a certification level of the position with a lower reliability 
and safety index. This level can be used in non-mission critical contexts.  
To release this certification level, only high-level GNSS data are verified (step D) 
with a low need in terms of computational resources on the server side.  




A-B-C-D B-C-D C-D D 
Certification 
Level 
A1 A2 A3 B 




Each of these levels assumes that the OPCAClient is able to acquire, process and 
send the relevant information necessary to perform the checks required in the 
specific steps. For example, in steps A, B and C the OPCAClient must be able to 
acquire and process the raw data of the GNSS signals made available by the 
underlying hardware/software platform of the mobile device. In the case of lack of 
particular information, the relative verification step will not be completed, but will 
be released the certification level closer to the client's request, based on the 
availability of the data sent by the client. 
The following flowchart summarizes the different verification steps performed by 















Spoofing and countermeasures 
 
 
7.1 GPS spoofing and countermeasures 
 
The main purpose of the OPCAServer is to detect and contrast all those situations 
in which an attacker (directly or indirectly) wants to exhibit a position different 
from the one actually occupied.  
The spoofing techniques have the objective to reproduce a GNSS radio signal as 
faithful as possible (carrier, frequency, phase, doppler shift, signal power, signal to 
noise ratio), through which to send to the mobile device a PRN ranging code (data 
bit) that encodes a fake navigation message (data frame) appropriately modified or 
created ad hoc, such as to induce the mobile device to calculate a different position 
from that currently occupied. 
At this point we are remark that, in theory, it is possible to carry out spoofing 
techniques through several attackers located in different geographical areas. A 
typical case is that of an attacker who wants to exhibit a position different from that 
really occupied through the help of an accomplice who is really in the fake position 
to want to exhibit. In this specific case the accomplice could acquire the real signal 
through his device and send to the attacker the geolocation data necessary to carry 
out the attack. Although difficult to apply, due to the need of at least one accomplice 
 
who actually occupies the fake position in the specific instant of time, one must be 
aware that it is not possible to exclude such a type of attack a priori. In the following 
thesis work are investigated only the spoofing techniques and the possible 
countermeasures involving a single attacker. Scenarios involving more attackers 
distributed in different geographical areas are left as future research work.  
In the specific case of GPS, a well-made simulator should be able to reproduce the 
following signals, PRN codes and navigation messages: 
 
1 The predictable civil PRN code C/A-Code L1 through which to send to the 
client the structure and the navigation message (frames, subframes and 
words) of the specific GPS satellite; 
 
2 The signal pattern of the encrypted military PRN code P(Y)-code, referred 
to the specific satellite and to the specific time window in which the position 
certification request occurs, and detectable by some GNSS receiver as a 
kind of background noise. 
 
As regards point 1, it is easy to reproduce the high-level navigation message even 
through cheap and widespread GNSS hardware or software simulators.  
Point 2 is much more complicated to emulate because it is a military code that 
cannot be decrypted by a common civil GNSS devices and/or a simulator. 
Independently of the required certification level, the OPCAServer will always 
check the high-level data (step D - data frame and navigation message) acquired 
and processed on the server side in the reference time window, comparing them 
with those processed and sent on the client side. 
As the required certification level increases, further checks on low-level data will 
be added (step A - signal direction and satellite speed, step B – signal strength and 
signal to noise ratio, step C - military code pattern).  
The most widespread spoofing scenarios of a GNSS signals with a single attacker 
in the scientific literature are basically three. Some of these are purely theoretical 
attacks, because in practice they require considerable resources in terms of 




7.1.1 Spoofing with a single antenna and a GNSS simulator in a 
protected environment  
 
The most complex and sophisticated scenario to contrast is that in which a user 
wants to falsify his position by isolating the mobile device from real signals coming 
from the space and radiating it with different fake signals created ad hoc using 
dedicated antennas and GNSS simulators. 
In reality every single GPS satellite moves in space with a speed close to 14,000 
km per hour. It is important to note that signals from different satellites come from 




Figure 12 - Spoofing of the GNSS signals with a single antenna  
and a GNSS simulator in a protected environment 
 
In theory, therefore, a simulator in a protected environment, in order to recreate the 
portion of GPS satellite constellation detectable in a given place and moment, 
should reproduce for each visible satellite the specific predictable PRN code C/A-
Code L1 (low level signal) and the specific navigation message (high level data) 
through a dedicated simulator. Moreover, these simulators should be positioned 
coherently with the real position in the sky of the corresponding satellite to be 
simulated and should reproduce both the movement of the specific satellite and the 
Doppler shift (displacement) of each single radio signal. 
 
From this description it is clear that this is an impractical attack in reality given the 
precision required in simulating the position, absolute and relative speed of all the 
satellites in sight. In practice, therefore, a hypothetical attacker is limited to using a 
GPS simulator equipped with a single antenna that radiates from the same direction 
the different signals to be replicated.  
The basic points to counteract this spoofing attack are two characteristics common 
to all satellite navigation systems: 
 
1 In a specific sub-area, at a given moment, clients and servers see exactly the 
same satellites; 
 
2 GNSS signals arriving at a mobile device from the same direction indicate 
that there was a spoofing attack. 
 
The Step A of the OPCAServer verification flow is able to identify these types of 
attacks thanks to these two characteristics.  
Through the use of different GNSS receiving antennas, the server can calculate the 
direction of the radio signals and the speed of the satellites, respect to the data 
acquired in the specific reference window, using radio signal interferometry 
techniques [14].  The same techniques are applied to the raw data sent by the 
OPCAClient in the same reference window. Discrepancies in the direction of 
signals, position and speed of the satellites between client and server in the specific 












7.1.2 Spoofing through the acquisition of a real signal appropriately 
modified  
 
Another spoofing scenario could be achieved by acquiring a real GNSS signal 
coming from the space, modifying and retransmitting it in real time using special 
transmitter towards the mobile device under spoofing attack. 
The modification could consist in the introduction of a simple retransmission delay 
of the real signal so as to change the arrival time and the calculation of the satellite-
receiver distance. 
Also this type of attack uses GNSS radio signals retransmitted from the same 
direction. As for the previous one, therefore, the following spoofing scenario can 




Figure 13 - Spoofing of the GNSS signal with external acquisition of the original signals and 









7.1.3 Spoofing with single GNSS antenna simulator in an open 
environment using higher transmission power  
 
Another technique of spoofing is to use an outdoor GNSS simulator, irradiating the 
victim device with an artifact signal having a greater transmission power so as to 
force this one to acquire the artifact signal instead of the weaker original radio 
signals coming from the GNSS satellites. 
The countermeasures that can be adopted to avoid this type of attack are based on 
a specific feature of GNSS signals: real GNSS radio signals arrive from space with 
low transmission power. In case the receiver is not completely isolated from 
external signals, a possible attacker who uses a simulator to irradiate a spoofing 
signal must use a transmission power higher than the original one, in order to 
mislead the mobile device and force it to catch the fake signal created ad hoc instead 
of the weak original satellite radio signal. 
The signal power is verified in the Step B of the verification process. A higher 
transmission power indicates that the signal was manipulated. Even in the case of 
complete isolation, a potential attacker should irradiate the device with the right 
transmission power and recreate a consistent signal/noise ratio and statistics of the 
pseudorange GPS C/A-code L1 code noise for each satellite to be simulated. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Spoofing of the GNSS signal with single-antenna simulator  
in an open environment using higher transmission power 
 
 
The verification Steps C and D represent a further defense towards spoofing attacks. 
As already mentioned, Step D (verification of the data frame and high level data 
navigation messages) is always carried out independently of the certification level 
requested and type of spoofing attack in progress. 
Step C, on the other hand, could be used to release the certification level A3, if low-





Conclusions and future works 
The first part of this thesis offers two methods that allow to save storage space in 
the management of the keys performed by a Hardware Security Module. The first 
method is based on the keys generation through the use of a pseudo-random number 
generator and on how storage space is traded with computing time. Three variants 
of this method have been proposed, each of which aims at achieving different 
tradeoffs between storage space and computing time. The second method offers a 
solution to reduce the cost of the computing time of the keys re-generation through 
the random functions which cut out the need to store any initial information. The 
method also offers a solution to generate a small number of intermediate pseudo-
random values before the specific pseudo-random value needed for the key 
generation is produced.  
In the second part of the thesis, an Outdoor Position Certification Authority (OPCA) 
has been designed and presented. The service offered by an OPCA is useful in many 
different contexts some of which are the legally valuable certification of the 
geographical position of a user in a specific moment, the geographical position of 
a device or a service happening in a precise moment. An OPCA will also enhance 
and improve the security and reliability of existing services as well as represent a 
building block for the start-up of new businesses.  
An OPCA can be used in Business to Consumer (B2C) contexts, such as the 
positioning certificate for the remote electronic signature of a digital document, or 
in Business to Business (B2B) contexts, such as the transportation and the delivery 
of various goods in the supply chain. 
This type of certification service will also improve the security in new emerging 
business models such as the delivery of goods and services through drones. 
The reliability and availability of an OPCA system can be improved by acquiring, 
analysing and correlating other geo-localization data acquired from existing and 
widely distributed communication systems such as the mobile phone network. For 
example, through the use of telephone cells and their Base Transceiver Station 
(BTS) and the acknowledgment of their geographical position, it is possible to 
 
calculate the signal power and estimate the distance of a mobile device from the 
BTS with a very low margin of error. This accuracy depends on the quantity of 
telephone cells present in the area in which the OPCA is operating. It is possible to 
estimate the distance from all visible BTS, of all types (GSM-2G, GPRS-2.5G, 
EDGE-2.75G, UMTS-3G, HSPA-3.5G, LTE-4G) and operators [21].  
In the future, thanks to mobile phones networks, WIFI networks, IP localization 
technology and other sensors (such as barometer, magnetometer, accelerometer, 
gyroscope, etc.) installed on modern mobile devices, the certification service is 
likely to be extended to indoor environments usage despite the absence of GNSS 
radio signal. The use of the above mentioned indoor positioning techniques [22] is 
to lay the ground for a new research based on the design of an Indoor/Outdoor 
Position Certification Authority (IOPCA). 
Finally, it is possible to make the service more robust by identifying analysis 
techniques that cover all those spoofing scenarios in which more attackers are 
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